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378 PEOPLE V. PARHAM: [60 C.2d 
[Crilll. Xo. 7428. In Bank. Sept. 12, 1963.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALVIN 
MAURICE PARHAM, Defendaut and Appellant. 
[1] Robbery-Evidence--Identity of Accused.-Dcfl.'lldant's iden-
tification as the robber of three banks· was supported by evi-
dence that severnl witnesses picked defendant out of a police 
lineup as the robber and by their ndditional identification of 
him at the trial, and the fact thnt during the lineup the other 
participants then'in tried on defendnnt's hat and coat, which 
allegedly did not fit nny of them, did not make the witnesses' 
identification unreliable and prejudicial; the manner in which 
the lineup was conducted afIeeted only the weight of the 
witnesses' testimony, not its admissibility. 
[2] Contempt-Defense--Inability to Comply With Order.-An 
executive order of the United States Attorney General for-
bidding an elllployee of the Department of Justice from pro-
ducing or disclosing information in the files of the depart-
ment is valid and has the force of federal law, and a trial 
court may properly refuse to hold in eontenlpt an agent of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation who, pursuant to such 
order, withheld information as to statements of witnesses 
taken by the F.B.I. which defendnnt sought to examine. 
f3] Criminal Law-Trial-Inspection of Papers.-In a robbery 
prosecution, the prosecutor was entitled to use the testimony 
of certain witnesses even though their signed statements made 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation were not produced for 
defendant's inspection where such statements were in the 
possession of the Department of Justice, not the prosecution, 
and were withheld pursuant to an executive order of the· 
United States Attorney General, where the prosecution did 
not withhold the statements but on the contrary made every 
effort to obtain them from the F.B.I., and where there was 
nothing to show that the police conspired with the federal 
agents to deprive defendant of the statcments. 
[4] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause: Searches and 
Seizures-Incidental to Arrest.-There was probable cause 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 49; Am.Jur., Contempt (1st ed 
§ 72). 
[3] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Trial, § 383; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed 
§ 917) ; Triul (1st ed § 113). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Robbery, § 33(1); [2] Contempt, 
§ 33; [3] Crilllinal Law, § 272; [4] Arrest, § 12(13); Searches and 
Sl'iZUl'('s, § 24; [5] Robbl'l'Y, § 46; [6] Criminal Luw, § 409. 
) 
/) 
Sl'jlt.1963J Pl·:OPJ.E t'. PARJIA:lr 379 
roo C.~d 3.8; 33 C .. I.R"tr. 407. ::S4 r.~d 10011 
for defendnnt's nrrest as a suspectC'd bnnk robhC'r where the 
arresting ornerr knew a ;,tol('n cnr had bt'l'n used in a bank 
robbery and abandoned in the al"t'1i in which defendant WIlS 
found, where ddendnnt gave the orneer nn unlikely expla-
nation of his prt'srnce there, jnstifying' the officrr's r('C}uest 
for identification, whert' the officer cnl1l1ert('d the dC'~cription 
given on defC'ndant's driver's license with a dl'scription of the 
bank robber, with which he was familiar, wlll're the officer 
saw a folded piece of pink paper, which hc thought was a 
check, in dcfcndnnt's possession when he produced .his driv-
er's license nnd was justified in latcr asking to see it, and 
where defendant then put the check into his mouth and be-
gan chewing it; a subsequent search was incidC'nt to the ar-
rest and was thus lawful. 
[5] Robbery-Appeal-Harmless Error-Evidence.-In a robbery 
prosecution in which it appenred that after a struggle of five 
to seven minutC's during' which one officer wl'('stled with de-
fendant and another omc('r applied prrssure to defendant's 
cheeks, defendant vons struck twice on the back of the neck 
with a police club causing him to spit out fragments of a 
check th:1t he was chewing, 811l'h conduct on the officers' part 
was unreasonable Ilnd in violation of due process, but the 
improper admission into evidence of the check frngments was 
not prejudicial where the check, though relevant, was merely 
cumulative of other undisputed evidence in the record, and 
where the other evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelm-
ing. 
[6] Criminal Law-Evidence-Evidence Wrongfully Obtained.-
That illegally obtained evidence has been admitted does not, 
except in the case of admission of an involuntary confession, 
require automatic reversal without regard for prejudice when 
there is compelling legally obtained evidence of guilt. (Dis-
approving any implication to the contrnry in People v. Erick-
.on, 210 Cal.App.2d 177, 183 [26 Cal.Rptr. 546].) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Alameda County and from an order denying a new trial. 
William J. McGuiness, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal 
from order dismissed. 
Prosecution for robbery. Judgment of conviction of first 
degree robbery affirmed. 
Paul Robbins, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, .John S. McInerny, Eric 
Collins and Albt'rt \V. Harris, Jr., Dt'puty Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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TRAYNOR, J,-Defendant was convicted on three counts 
of first degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211a.) He appeals from 
the judgment and from the order denying his motion for a 
nt'w trial. The appt'al from the order denying a new trial is 
dismissed. (Pen. Code, § 1237.) 
Defendant contends that he was denied the right to inspect 
the signed statements of several witnesses and therefore was 
denied a fair trial, that he was placed in an improperly con-
ducted lineup and therefore his identification by several wit-
nesses was unreliable and prejudicial as a matter of law, 
that he was arrested without probable cause and therefore 
the search incident to his arrest was unreasonable, and that 
when he was arrested the police forced evidence from his 
mouth by unconstitutional methods. 
[1] Defendant was arrested on July 21, 1961, and on the 
same day was placed with five other men in a police lineup 
at the Berkeley Police Station. During the lineup, each man 
in turn tried on defendant's hat and coat. After observing 
the lineup several witnesses of the three bank robberies for 
which defendant was cOllvicted identified defendant as the 
robber. '1'hese witnesses also identified defendant at the trial. 
Defendant contends that his hat and coat did not fit any of 
the other men in the lineup and that therefore the witnesses' 
identification of him was unreliable and prejudicial. This 
contention is without merit, The manner in which the lineup 
was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses' testi-
mony, not its admissibility. The witnesses were thoroughly 
cross-examined concerning the lineup, It was the jury's 
function to consider the circumstances of the lineup in weigh-
ing the witnesses' testimony. The jury's implied finding that 
identity was established is supported by the evidence. 
At the trial most of the identifying witnesses testified that 
after the lineup they gave signed statements to agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. Defendant moved for pro-
duction of the statements. The prosecution responded that 
the statements were not available to it. Inspector Young (If 
the Berkeley Poliet' was present when the witnesses were in-
terviewed by the F.B.I. and took notes of the interviews but 
did not take signed statements. Defendant was given a copy 
of Inspector Young's notes and also the statt'mellt of one 
identifying witness taken by the Berkeley Police. 
In cllambers the proseeutor stated that he had been permit-
ted to examine the statements taken by the F.B.I., that he 
had tried to obtain the statements but that the F.B.I. had 
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rejeeied his I't'qllt'st, and that he did not have the statements 
in his possl'ssioll all11 no longer had access to them. Upon the 
trial cOllrt 's ~tlg'g'I·"ti{)11 defendant then obtaincd a subpoena 
duces teeLllll tlil't'l'tillg' Special Agent Buchanan of the F.B.I. 
to appeal' with the investigative file on the bank robberies. 
Agcnt Buchanan appeared with an assistant United States 
attOrlH'Y \rho 1Hl\-isl'd the court that Agent Buchanan could 
not produl'c tl1l' inwstigative file because of order No. 3229 of 
the Attol'lH.'Y G(,l1eral of the United Statps. Agent Buchanan 
testifi"d that IJ(' had delivered the file to the assistant United 
States attorl1l~.\· and that he could not testify concerning the 
contents of thc file because of order No. 3229. Defendant's 
motion that Agent Buchanan be held in contempt was 
denied. Tilt, COUl't also denied defendant's subsequent motion 
to strike the testimony of all witnesses whose signed state-
ments had 110t been produced. 
[2] Order No. 3229 compelled Agent Buchanan to refuse to 
produce the F.B.I. file. l That order is valid and l1as the force 
of federal law. (United States ex reI. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 
462 [71 S.Ct. 416, 95 L.Ed. 417]; Jackson v. Allen Indus-
tries, Inc., 250 F.2d 629.) The trial conrt was therefore boullfl ! 
by the executive order and properly refused to hold Agent I 
Buchanan in contempt. (See Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 
459 [20 S.Ct. 701, 44 L.Ed. 846] ; Appeal of United States 
Securities &- Exchange Corn., 226 F.2d 501, 516-520; Ex parte 
Sackett, 74 F.2d 922; In re Valecia Condensed Milk Co .• 2-l:0 
F. 310; Stegall Y. Thurman, 175 F. 813; In re Weeks, 82 F. 
729; In re Huttman, 70 F. 699; Hubbard v. Southern Ry. Co., 
179 F. Supp. 244.) 
[3] Defendant contends that because the signed statements 
were not produced he was deprived of a fair trial by the 
denial of his motion to strike the witnesses' testimony. Had 
the witnesses' statements been in the possession of the prose-
lOrder No. 3229 provides that when an employee of the Departmcnt 
of Justie.e is served with a Bubpoena or order to pro,luce information 
in the files of the department, a representative of the United States 
attorney shall appear with the employee and inform the court that the 
employee is not authorize.l to produce or disclose the information 
songht. Time must then be requestcJ to refer the mattcr to the At· 
torney Gellcral. In tl.:8 case the assistant United States attorney 
stated that he would ,·olnlllunic·,tte with the Attorn('y G,'ncral unll 
ntldse Il.c rourt if he were given any other instrudions. Defense 
"onllsel thereafter ('on('c'led th:lt the st:,tpmcnts could 110t be pro-
d"t'pt!, awl the ,-o, ... t dl'lti,·,l the Illotion to holt! ,\gent Buchanan in 
(·(llllc·ltlpt. (II! Ft:d. nl'g. 13fj~.) 
) 
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cution an order to produce would have been proper. (People 
v. E~trada, 54 Ca1.2d 713, 716 [7 Cal.Hptr. 897, 3jj 1'.2<1 
641] ; People v. Chapma 11, 52 Cal.2d 9;), 98·99 [3:38 P.~d 428 J ; 
People v. Riser, 47 Cal.~d 5G6, 585-588 [305 P.2d 1].) More-
over, had defendant been prosecut('d under federal law the 
statemellts could have been produced under the Jencks Act. 
(18 U.S.C.A. § 3500.) It does IIOt follow, however, that the 
use of the witnessl's' testimony even though tlll'ir prior state-
ments were unavailable deprived defendant of a fair trial. 
The prosecution did not withhold the stateme'nts, but on the 
contrary made every effort to obtain them from the F.RI. 
The prosecution cannot be penalized because those efforts 
failed. The prosecution is not penalizl'd if, throug-h no fault 
of statc officials, a material witness for the defe!lse is Ull-
ayailable at trial. (People v. Wade, 118 Cal. 672, 6n [50 P. 
841] ; People v. Williams, 168 Cal.App.2d 624, 626-627 [336 
P.2d 245] ; see People v. Collins, 195 Cal. 325, 333 [23:3 1'.97].) 
It does not appear that the statements werc unayailable 
because of any improper activity by state officials. Th~' p(llice 
were und!'r no compulsion to take sta trmrnts from the' wit-
nesses. (See People v. Tuthill, 31 Ca1.2d 92. 97-98 [lS7 P.2d 
16].) There is nothing to show that the police eonspirrd with 
the federal agents to deprive defelldant of the stat"l1lt'l1 ts. 
The pros!'clltion was therefore entitled to nse the testi mony 
of the witnesses even though their signed statements were 
l1TlayailabJc. 
[4] The evidrnce concerning defendant's arrest SllOWS that 
while on patrol on the afternoon of Friday, July 21, 1961, 
Officrr DOllOyan of the Em!'ryville Police drove to a parking 
area at the foot of Powell Street ill Emeryville ana th!'rc saw 
defcndant standing between a linc of parked cars and the bay. 
Hc asked defendant" if he l1ad some trouble," and defendant 
rl'plied that he was on his lunch hour. Defendant also said 
that he worked at the San Pablo Cleaners, and that his lunch 
hour ended at 1 p.m. It was then 1 :18. Officer Donovan asked 
for identification, and defendant took a money clip from his 
pockct and produced a temporary driyer's license. Officer 
Donovan saw in the money clip a red or maroon bank pass-
book and a folded pink piece of paper tllat he thought was a 
check. He then wrote the name, address, and description from 
the driver's license on a field interrogation card. 
Officer Donovan connected the description on the driver's 
license with a Berkeley Police bulletin that he had in his car 
and that he had seen several times. The bulletin gave an 
account of olle of the bank robberies for which defendant has 
Sept. 1963] PIWPLE V. PARJlAll 383 
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be('n convirted and contained a description and composite 
sketch of the robber. On the morning of JUly 21 Officer 
Donovan had looked at another copy of the bulletin posted at 
police h('adqnarters. Officer Donovan was also aware that 
there had been a bank robbery on a previous Friday after-
noon and tl1at a stolen car used in the commission· of the 
robbery llad been abandoned afterward at the foot of Powell 
Street. 
When Officer Donovan completed the field interrogation 
card, defendant told him that his car was parked up tIle 
street and tllat he lmd additional information in it. Defend· 
ant then voluntarily rode with Officer Donovan to defend· 
ant's car. On the way Officer Donovan radioed headquarters 
for assistance. TIle patrol car was parked behind defendant's 
car, both men got out, and defendant (,lltered his rar throur~h 
the rigllt front door and sat on the seat while Officer Dono. 
van stood outside the open door. Defendant then took out his 
money clip, rrmoved the pink paper, and put the paper in his 
pocket. Officer Donovan asked what the paper was, and de. 
fendant said that it was a check. After Officer Donovan asked 
to see the check, defendant withdrew it from his pocket, put 
it in his mouth, and rolled over face do,vn on the seat of the 
car. After a struggle Officer Donovan arrested dcfcndant, 
and both defendant and his car were searched. Incriminating 
evidence obtained in the search was admitted at the trial over 
defendant's objection. 
Defendant's contention that he was arrested without prob-
able cause cannot be sustained. The knowledge that a stolen 
car had been used in a bank robbery and abandoned in the 
Powell Strret parking area and the unlikely explanation de-
fendant gavc for being there justified Officer Donovan's ask. 
ing defendant for identification. (See People v. Micl.elson, 
59 Ca1.2d 448, 450·451 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) Offi· 
cer Donovan did nothing unreasonable in taking defendant 
to his car, since defendant said he had further information 
there and voluntarily rode in the patrol car. Having con· 
nected defendant's description with the description on tne 
police bulletin, Officer Donovan was justifi('d in asking to see 
the check that defendant put in his pock{'t. With his suspi. 
cion thus already justifiably aroused, Officer Donovan had 
probable cause to make an arrest when dcff'ndant be~an 
chewing the check. The srarch that follow{'d was incident to 
the arrest and was therefore lawful. (People v. Mickelson, 
59 Ca1.2d 448,451 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18,380 P.2d 658].) 
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[5] We agree, however, with defendant's contention that 
the methods used by the police in obtaining the chcck from 
his mouth were unreasonable and in violation of due process. 
(Rochin v. State of California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173 [72 
S.Ot. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 190-191, 25 .A.L.R.2d 1396, 1402-
1403].) When defendant rolled over face down on the seat of 
the ear, Officer Donovan entered the car and began wrestling 
with him in an attempt to extricate the check . .At this point, 
Officer Spongberg arrived in response to the call for assist-
ance. Officer Spongberg leaned through the left front window 
of defendant's car and with the fingers of both hands began 
to press on defendant's cheeks. Defendant continued to chew 
on the check. Officer Spongberg then took Officer Donovan's 
police club and struck defendant twice on the back of the 
neck. Defendant then spit out the bloody fragments of the 
check. 
The struggle lasted between five and seven minutes. It is 
undisputed that defendant neither resisted arrest nor at-
tempted to flee and that the officers' only objective in the 
fray was to extract the check from defendant's mouth. 
Under these circumstances the force used by the officers was 
excessive. Choking a man to extract evidence from his mouth 
violates due process. (People v. Erickson, 210 Cal..App.2d 
177, 181-182 [26 Ca1.Rptr. 546] ; People v. Sevilla, 192 Cal. 
App.2d 570, 573-578 [13 Ca1.Rptr. 714] ; People v. Martinez, 
130 Ca1.App.2d 54 [278 P.2d 26].) Clubbing a man to obtain 
evidence is equally brutal and offensive, and the check thus 
obtained should not have been admitted into evidence. 
It is clear, however, that even had the check been excluded 
from evidence, the result would have been the same. .Al-
though the cheek was relevant because in each of the three 
bank robberies the robber used a pink piece of paper or a 
check to demand money, it was merely cumulative of other 
undisputed evidence in the record. Thus, its masticated rem-
nants showed only that it was a check, a fact established by 
the officer's testimony as to what he heard and saw before 
any illegal conduct occurred and by defendant's own testi-
mony at the trial. Moreover, the other evidence of defend-
ant's guilt is overwhelming. Eyewitnesses to each of the rob-
beries identified defendant as the robber. In one robb,'ry de-
fendant escaped with a bank bag of money. Shortly there-
after, the owner of a car stolen from Golden Gate Fields S!lVl 
defendant return the car. Defendant attempted to explain 
that he thought the car was his, then got out of the car with 
a money bag in his hand and fled. The evidence shows that 
) 
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the ear had been hot-wired. The car used in another of the 
robberies and abandoned in the Powell Street parking area 
had al80 been hot-wired, Defendant was experienced in hot-
wiring, and at the time of his arrest in the Powell Street area 
was carrying the wires and tools customarily used in hot-
wiring. A gun and savings passbook like those found in de-
feudant's possession when he was arrested were used in one 
or more of the robberies. 
[6] Defendant contends, however, that the admission of ! 
the check in evidence constituted a denial of due process of 
law and that therefore the harmless error rule cannot save· 
the judgment. He invokes the rule that the admission of an 
involuntary confession in evidence requires reversal regard-
less of other evidence of guilt presented to the jury. 
(LYllumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [83 S.Ct. 917, 922, 9 L.Ed. 
2d 922J ; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-541 [81 S.Ct. i 
735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760, 766-767] ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 
560, 567-568 [78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975, 980-981] ; Stroble 
v. State of CaUfornia, 343 U.S. 181, 190 [72 S.Ct. 599, 96 
hEd. 872, 880-881].) Almost invariably, however, a confes-
sion will constitute persuasive evidenee of guilt, and it is 
therefore usually extremely difficult to determine what part 
it played in securing the conviction. (See Payne v. Arkansas, , 
356 U.S. 560, 568 [78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975, 981] ; Allen, 
Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for 
Wolf, 1961 Sup,Ct.Rev. 1, 45; cf. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 
U.S. 52, 55 [82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114, 116-117].) These 
considerations justify treating involuntary confessions as a 
class by themselves and refusing to inquire whether in rare 
cases tlleir admission in evidence had no bearing on the 
result. 
Unlike involuntary confessions, other illegally obtained 
evidence may be, as in this case, only a relatively insignifi-
cant part of the total evidence and have no effect on the 
outcome of the trial. To require automatic reversal because of 
its admission is to lose sight of the basic purpose of the 
exclusionary rule to deter unconstitutional methods of law 
enforcement. (Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 [80 
S.Ct. 1437, 1453, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688, 1669] j Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 656 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090-10911; 
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 443, 445 [282 P.2d 905, 50 
A.L.R.2d 513].) Unless we were to take the unprecedentt'd 
step of holding that the state must be penalized for violating 
a defendant's constitutional rights in securing evidence by 
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conferring an immunity upon him (see People v. Valenti, 49 
Ca1.2d 199, 203 [316 P.2d 633J), we must consider the d<>ter-
rent effect of the exclusionary rule not as a penalty but as 
derived from the principle that the state must not profit 
from its own wrong. (Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 
64-65 [74 S.Ot. 354, 98 IJ.Ed. 503, 506-507]; McDonald v. 
Un-ited States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 [69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153, 
158-159]; People v. JIartin, 45 Ca1.2d 755, 760 [290 P.2d 
855].) The state does not so profit when erroneously admitted 
evidence does not affect the result of the trial. A reversal for 
the admission of illegally obtained evidence without regard 
for prejudice when there is compelling legally obtained evi-
dence of guilt constitutE'S nothing more than a penalty, not 
for the officer's illegal conduct in securing the evidence, but 
solely for the prosecutor's blunder in offering it and the trial 
court's error in admitting it. To require automatic reversal 
for such harmless error could not help but generate pressure 
to find that the unreasonable police conduct was lawful after 
all and thereby to undermine constitutional standards of 
police conduct to avoid needlE'ss retrial. (See People v. 
Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 452 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 
658] ; People v. Ditson, 57 Ca1.2d 415, 439-440 [20 Cal.Rptr. 
165, 369 P.2d 714].) An exclusionary rule so rigidly ad-i 
ministered could thereby defeat itself. \Ve conclude that i 
since there is no reasonable probability that the admission of 
the check in evidence affected the result, the judgment must 
be affirmed. (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 41j::!; People v. Tarantino 
45 Ca1.2d 590, 595 [290 P.2d 505]; People v. Valenti, 49 
Ca1.2d 199, 203 [316 P.2d 633J ; People v. Edgar, ante, p. 171 
[32 Cal.Rptr. 41, 383 P.2d 449]; People v. Regalado, 193 
Cal.App.2d 437, 442-443 [14 Cal.Rptr. 217]; People v. 
Gardner, 177 Cal.App.2d 43, 46-47 [1 Cal.Rptr. 830J; see 
People v. lV oods, 133 Cal.App.2d 187, 191-192 [283 P.2d 
778J; People v. Morgan, 146 Cal.App.2d 722, 724 [304 P.2d 
138].) Any implication to the contrary in People v. Erickson, 
210 Cal.App.2d 177, 183 [26 Cal.Rptr. 546] is disapproved. 
The jUdgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobrin-
er, J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October 
16, 1963. 
